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CHAPTER 29 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 
I. IN DEFENSE OF MEDIOCRITY 
HAROLD BROWN 
§29.1. Introduction. After five years of toiling, with three meet-
ings each month, a distinguished committee of the ABA has con-
ceptualized the first general revision of the Canons in this century, 
including Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. Since the 
adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility by the ABA in 
August, 1969, to become effective January 1, 1970, three minor amend-
ments were approved in 1970. Although the Code is technically bind-
ing only on members of the ABA, it has already been enacted in 12 
states and is actively under consideration in numerous jurisdictions.1 
Because of the sweeping changes proposed by the new Code, every 
attorney has an obligation to familiarize himself with its terms, not 
only as a matter of self-interest, but for the benefit of the profession 
itself and the society it serves. 
At the same time, in spite of its prestigious credentials, the Code is 
fairly subjective to critical appraisal as a whole and in its detailed 
provisions. While some bar associations may mistakenly gloss over the 
HAROLD BROWN is senior partner in the firm of Brown and Leighton, Boston. 
He is the author of numerous legal articles and of Franchising: Trap for the 
Trusting (1969, 1970 Appendices). The views herein expressed are those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent the position of the Annual Survey of 
Massachusetts Law or its publisher, Little, Brown & Company. 
§29.1. 1 As of June 15, 1970, of the 12 states that adopted the Code as the 
standard governing the practice of law, the following states have adopted it without 
change: New Hampshire, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Arkansas and 
Oklahoma. The following states have adopted it with certain amendments: Illinois, 
Wisconsin, Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado. 
In Nebraska the only change that was made in adopting the Code was that it was 
adopted without DR 2-103(D)(5), which was referred to the State Judicial Council 
for further study. In Kansas the Code was adopted without change, except that the 
Ethical Considerations were approved in principle rather than adopted. 
In the following states the Code has been approved by the state bar association 
without change, and a recommendation for adoption has been made to the state 
supreme court: Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ohio, Indiana 
and Minnesota. 
In the following states the Code has been approved by the state bar association 
with certain changes and has been recommended for adoption to the state supreme 
court: District of Columbia, Virginia, Florida and Arizona. 
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proposal in brief hearings before unrepresentative committees, it 
should be emphasized that much more is demanded since the adoption 
of the Code by court decree will have the effect of binding legislation. 
As such, the judiciary should first afford the widest latitude to analysis 
and criticism by every member of the bar, as well as by bar associations. 
It would indeed be difficult to quarrel with the platitudes in the 
newly stated Canons themselves, each of which simply describes a 
noble goal, namely: 
Canon 1 A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity 
and Competence of the Legal Profession 
Canon 2 A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfill-
ing Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available 
Canon 3 A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law 
Canon 4 A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets 
of a Client 
Canon 5 A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional 
Judgment on Behalf of a Client 
Canon 6 A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently 
Canon 7 A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within 
the Bounds of the Law 
Canon 8 A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System 
Canon 9 A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Pro-
fessional Impropriety 
Each Canon is followed by "Ethical Considerations" consisting of 
numbered paragraphs with discursive exposition of the generalities 
stated in the respective Canon. There then follow the Canon's "Disci-
plinary Rules," which speak in statutory form and obviously lay the 
basis for judicial review of professional misconduct, with a view 
toward censure, suspension, or even disbarment for their violation. 
Perhaps most significantly, there are no procedural provisions to 
indicate the manner in which the Canons may be implemented, the 
forum to which resort may be had, and the provisions for judicial 
review, if any. Perhaps it was intended that each state should adopt 
its own procedures, whether directly or indirectly through statewide 
or local bar associations, the attorney general, district attorneys, special 
court proceedings, or by the highest court of each state. As will be 
seen, the substantive features of the Disciplinary Rules are such as to 
make the procedural matters of crucial importance. Significantly, in 
states which have adopted the "Unified Bar," of which there are over 
thirty already and more in the offing, it is conceivable that matters of 
discipline may well repose in completely nonjudicial, as well as non-
governmental, forums. 
A copy of the entire Code (including the Canons, the Ethical Con-
siderations, the Disciplinary Rules, and lengthy annotations), con-
sisting of 48 pages, can be obtained directly from the ABA in Chicago 
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or possibly from various state bar associations. Although it would 
hardly be feasible to review all of such material in this chapter, it 
should be stressed that much of its content deserves the staunch sup-
port of every member of the bar. The criticism contained in this 
chapter should therefore be considered individually, rather than as a 
broad attack on the Code in its entirety. Such specific matters never-
theless raise such serious questions of morality and judgment that, 
without major revisions, the Code is not to be commended for adop-
tion. 
§29.2 Disciplinary Rules. In support of Canon 1, it is broadly 
stated that a lawyer shall not "Violate a Disciplinary Rule.''1 Having 
thus incorporated all of the extensive Disciplinary Rules by reference, 
it is then ordered that: 
A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation . . . 
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority 
empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.2 
Although the rule is limited to "unprivileged information," it never-
theless adopts an affirmative duty of reporting all "knowledge of a 
violation," any violation of which will in itself subject the nonreporter 
to the discipline of the Code. Perhaps for the first time in the annals 
of Anglo-American jurisprudence, there would thus be enacted a true 
"gestapo" informer system, with each attorney legally bound to police 
his brother attorney. Such a rule would go far beyond the bounds of 
"guilt by association," since there is no limit as to the source of such 
"knowledge," so long as it emanates from "unprivileged information.'' 
For example, a later rule provides penalties for the negligent prac-
tice of law,3 to be discussed further below. Apparently, if an attorney 
observes the incompetent argument of a motion or trial of a case while 
innocently sitting in a courtroom waiting for his own matter to be 
reached, it will be incumbent upon him to volunteer a full report of 
the "knowledge" so obtained, since failure to report will subject the 
observer to disciplinary action. While such a risk can be discreetly 
avoided by remaining in the courtroom corridor, such a burden cannot 
be escaped when it is based on observations made during the negotia-
tion of a lease or other contractual matter in which one's opponent 
apparently displays a lack of "competence.'' And since one must be 
certain to report accurately, hereafter the attorney should make a 
double set of notes, one on the matter at hand, the other on the con-
duct of one's opponent, since the reporting attorney should be careful 
to maintain his standing as a grade-A spy. Inefficient reporting of such 
incompetence may in itself constitute negligence. 
Since such obligations of an "official informer" are based on all of 
§29.2. 1 DR I-102(A)(l). 
2 DR l-103(A). 
a DR 6-lOl(A)(l)-(!1). 
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the Disciplinary Rules, several of which will be discussed below, every 
attorney would be well advised to study the rules meticulously, since it 
will surely be held that every attorney is "presumed to know the law," 
both as a prime offender and as a nonreporter of violations by others. 
Short of committing all the rules to memory, at the very least, copies 
should be carried in one's brief case. 
Before leaving the objective consideration of this rule, it may also 
be asked whether it is a violation for attorney A to fail to report that 
attorney B failed to inform on attorney C. After all, the standard of 
conduct now requires that attorney B fulfill his obligations as an 
informer. On the other hand, it is quite possible that such an exten-
sion of one's prime obligation as an informer does not require an 
investigation as to whether attorney B actually filed a report. It would, 
however, appear the better part of discretion at least to list the names 
and addresses of all the other attorneys in the courtroom who observed 
the incompetence of attorney A, though it is not quite clear as to 
whether this protective measure should be adopted prior to the ob-
servation of attorney A's incompetent conduct. 
Because of the general unfamiliarity of so many attorneys with the 
intricacies of "information," it might also be helpful to request a 
report from some with direct experience in such roles under the Nazi 
regime, some of whom might be willing to expostulate, albeit anony-
mously. A somewhat less efficient source of instruction would be 
recent college graduates whose experience with "honor codes" included 
similar reporting obligations. After all, every effort should be made to 
help attorneys to learn how to avoid "conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice,"4 because "even minor violations of law by 
a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession."5 
As previously suggested, perhaps the most interesting innovation is 
the command that a lawyer shall not "neglect a legal matter entrusted 
to him.''6 In disarmingly simple language, the rule would now expose 
all counsel not merely to civil liabi1ity for neglect, nor the salutary 
requirement of adequate insurance to cover professional liability, but 
now as well to the risk of disbarment. The hurried conveyancer who 
overlooks a last-minute real estate attachment can no longer find 
solace in prompt coverage from his personal funds, particularly since 
the negligence must be reported by the attorney for the attaching 
creditor, lest the latter himself be in violation. The commercial practi-
tioner had best become aware that many bankrupt estates are potential 
claimants under the antitrust laws and that overlooking the filing of 
such a claim could lead to counsel's disbarment. Though the degree of 
the negligence could mitigate the punishment, the rule itself would 
brook no exceptions. 
4 DR l-102(A)(5). 
5EC 1-5. 
6 DR 6-10l(A)(3). 
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Lest such threat be narrowly construed, the companion rule specifies 
that a lawyer shall not: 
Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is 
not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer 
who is competent to handle it.7 
Under this rule, it would be no defense that the matter was success-
fully concluded without negligence. There are, of course, some other 
pitfalls in the rule, such as the unspecified standards for "competence," 
not merely in the attorney's self-analysis, but also in that of selecting 
an associate. Since "competence" must depend on the difficulty of the 
client's problem, presumably young attorneys will of necessity spend 
much time seeking confirmation of their competence and even more to 
canvass experienced attorneys until they find one of sufficient self-
assurance to gamble on his own competence. 
Presumably "competence" will be considered in the dynamic sense, 
not merely in the attorney's static ability. The skill of a neophyte 
willing to make a thorough research of the law as well as an exhaustive 
analysis of the facts may have to be balanced against that of the leader 
of the bar who may first receive the case the night before trial with an 
investigator's sloppily prepared file. On the other hand, such a liberal 
interpretation may not be feasible if "competence" is to be judged in 
the abstract, as in some Orwellian file of every attorney's capabilities. 
Finally, the rules would specifically preclude any contractual provi-
sion for exoneration,8 so that no matter how enthusiastic or confident 
the client may be, and no matter how insistently he may want the 
particular attorney, the latter must boldly decline to accept the engage-
ment if any lurking doubt exists. Such limitation on exoneration 
should be contrasted with the customary limitations provided in many 
formal trusts, particularly where a bank or similar institution assumes 
fiduciary obligations. Although such full-blown trustees usually re-
quire exoneration except for willful neglect or fraudulent self-prefer-
ence, the attorney who might so provide would thereby violate a rule, 
even the "attempt" at exoneration being proscribed. 
The supposed justification for these rules is even more revealing. 
In one of the notes, great reliance is placed on the fact that with "con-
centration within a limited field, the greater the proficiency and expert-
ness that can be developed."9 Such a thrice "special" pronouncement 
would appear difficult to contest, were it not for the fact that a general 
disenchantment with the merits of specialization has at last begun to 
reach not only the legal but the medical profession as well. But while 
general practitioners are content to let specialists live in their own 
7 DR 6-lOl(A)(l). 
8 DR 6-102(A). 
9 Canon 6, n.2, quoting from the Report of the Special Committee on Specializa-
tion and Specialized Legal Education, 79 A.B.A. Rep. 582, 588 (1954). 
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rarified atmosphere, apparently the specialists have now decided to 
pre-empt the entire field. 
The non sequitur in the final justification for this rule apparently 
escaped the editorial committee when it simply quoted figures from 
the Annual Report of the Committee on Grievances of the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York10 to the effect that "of the 828 
offenses against clients, ... 452, or more than half of all such offenses, 
involved [sic] neglect." Obviously, that simple quotation from a news-
paper summary justifies the outlawing of "neglect" and the ostracism 
of any attorney guilty of such conduct. Whether such "neglect" was 
aggravated or consisted of excusable oversight will never be known. 
Nor does the rule permit any such distinction. It is as revealing as 
another blind conclusion to the effect that "If the attorney is not com-
petent to skillfully and properly perform the work, he should not 
undertake the service," citing a civil liability case, not a disbarment 
proceeding.11 
Rather than pursue this inquiry into the competence of the re-
porters or their obvious preference for the specialist, almost necessarily 
one associated with a large law firm, it would appear perfectly clear 
that the rules on "competence" are completely unworkable, excessively 
harsh, and ill-designed to accomplish the obviously desirable goal that 
"A lawyer should represent a client competently."12 Perhaps a few 
comments by an experienced general practitioner may broaden the 
scope of inquiry. 
Empirically, it may be assumed that about 90 percent of all attor-
neys would classify themselves as general practitioners, perhaps by 
choice and possibly to re,flect the nature of the legal services most gen-
erally required in the board stretches of this nation. But even in the 
urban centers where large firms abound with a plethora of specialists, 
it has become quite obvious that the absence of correlation of such 
services is a serious problem, compounded by the fact that the avail-
ability of such services is severely restricted by the financial limitations 
of most clients. If this would appear to be a defense of mediocrity, 
let it be known that in each attorney's sphere of activity there may well 
be the finest sense of accomplishment and professionally rendered 
service. 
Without categorizing questions of competence as a disbarrable of-
fense, perhaps there are other avenues for achieving that goal. Com-
mencing with higher standards in the law schools or even a radical 
revamping of their curricula, one might more closely examine the 
standards for admission to the bar and even a more general require-
ment of clerkships after admission. Perhaps lawyers should be en-
10 Canon 6, n.6, citing N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12, 1968, at 4, col. 5. 
11 Canon 6, n.3, quoting Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App. Div. 477, 481, 195 N.Y.S. 
810, 814 (1922), aff'd mem., 236 N.Y. 669, 142 N.E. 328 (1923). 
12 Canon 6, 
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couraged to emulate the medical profession, where it is customary for 
the experienced and specialists to donate a substarttial portion of their 
time to instruct and assist neophytes.13 Rather than reliance on the 
secret and privately administered rating system of the leading law list, 
with extensive advertising allowed by those who somehow achieve 
such ratings/4 thought might be given to community acknowledge-
ment of professional achievement in plans administered on a purely 
objective basis by bar associations or even governmental authority. For 
example, in England, law lists are severely restricted with regard to 
ratings, advertising, and exclusivity in their listings, and it is the 
government which designates outstanding members of the bar as 
"Queen's Counsel." The encouragement of excellence by appropriate 
incentives would enhance the image of the bar and increase its ca-
pacity to serve the community. 
Such a constructive approach should be contrasted not only with the 
capital threat of disbarment and the demoralization of a bar com-
pelled to inform on itself, but also the very practical result that every 
disgruntled client will have immediate power to blackmail his attor-
ney on fee matters no matter how fairly established or willingly paid 
in advance. With 50 percent of most litigants losing their cases, the 
extent of disappointment may easily turn to wrath for counsel's sup-
posed incompetence. 
Nor can there be ignored the direct effect of the "spying" and "com-
petence" rules on fee matters in general. Depending on the general in-
competence of the bar in the particular locality, the self-appointed 
competent attorney may well have to contemplate the loss of as much 
as 10 percent of his available hours spent in observing, documenting, 
reporting, and testifying against brother counsel. The incompetent 
attorney will have to allocate from 10 to 20 percent of his time to 
defending against charges of incompetence, seeking out competent 
associate counsel, and lucubration designed to eliminate his own 
incompetence. Such resulting loss of income must therefore be con-
sidered in the light of the rules on the subject of fees. 15 
The principal fiat on fees is the prohibition of an agreement, charge, 
or collection of "an illegal or clearly excessive fee,"16 the existence of 
which would be found when "a lawyer of ordinary [sic] prudence 
would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in 
excess of a reasonable fee." 17 Because numerous state and local bar 
associations also provide minimum fee schedules, the rule should be 
considered in the light of such local arrangements. Contrary to the 
advice of the ABA under the previous Canon 12 that such "minimum 
13 Canon I. 
14 See DR 2-102(A)(6). 
15 DR 2-106 and 2-107. 
16 DR 2-106(A). 
17 DR 2-106(B). 
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fee schedules can only be suggested or recommended and cannot be 
made obligatory,"18 many pressures undoubtedly are exerted to enforce 
such schedules, particularly in the 30 or more states which have adopted 
the "Unified Bar." 
Ethical considerations aside, all of such measures concerning mini-
mum or maximum fees must be considered in the light of the letter, as 
well as the spirit, of the federal antitrust laws and various state statutes 
of similar import. Under the federal statute, both minimum19 and 
maximum20 price maintenance constitutes a per se violation. Wherever 
attorneys have subscribed to such schedules, there is an express "con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy" in restraint of trade.21 Although the 
violation is even stronger where attorneys are subject to reprimand 
or censure for infractions, concerning price-fixing violations the 
United States Supreme Court has also cast doubt on the mildest ar-
rangements by condemning "consciously parallel action."22 Apparently 
unimpressed by either ethical or economic considerations, the Govern-
ment has recently instituted injunctive suit against a real estate 
brokers' association and its members where the latter agreed not to 
accept multiple listings except at the "recommended" commission 
rates.23 Aside from the minimum fee schedules of local associations, 
the ABA Code not only prohibits "clearly excessive fees" but affirma-
tively requires the policing of such maximum fees by all other attor-
neys.24 
There is no known or readily suggested basis for exempting legal 
services from the impact of the antitrust laws. Although some may 
suggest that many legal matters do not come within the "flow of inter-
state commerce" now used as the jurisdictional test for the federal 
statute, such would hardly appear true for most corporate and com-
mercial transactions. Even as to wholly intrastate matters, many states 
have adopted their own antitrust laws either directly or through enact-
ment of a "Baby" FTC Act.25 Although the antitrust law adopted in 
1970 by New Jersey would specifically exempt nonprofit a~~uciations in 
recommending fee schedules as guidelines,26 neither such action nor 
state adoption of the ABA Code would provide exemption from the 
federal statute. Rather than quibble as to the appiicability of such 
anticompetitive regulations, it would seem that of all businessmen, 
lawyers should do all in their power to "avoid even the appearance 
18 ABA Opinion No. 302 (1961). 
19 United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
20 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
21 15 u.s.c. §1. 
22 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1945); Milgram v. Loew's, 
Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929. 
23 Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. 1[45,069. 
24 DR l-103(A). 
25 E.g., G.L., c. 93A. 
26 1970 Trade Cas. 1[33,301. 
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of professional impropriety," in the exact words of Canon 9. Perhaps 
the draftsmen of the Canons will excuse this possible impugning of 
their competence under Canons 6 and 9, since it would appear obliga-
tory under Canon I and Disciplinary Rule l-l03(A). 
Perhaps the other most salient fee matter in the Code is its prohibi-
tion of referral fees among lawyers even though the client consents 
after full disclosure and the total fee does not clearly exceed reasonable 
compensation.27 Since the rule would permit the division of fees only 
"in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed 
by each" attorney, at the very least it must be recognized as a radical 
departure from widespread custom of long duration. Even if the Code 
be not adopted in a particular jurisdiction, forwarding counsel would 
do well to avoid entrapment either under the aegis of the ABA or 
in the state of the receiving attorney where such a provision of the 
Code may have been adopted. 
There may, of course, be some question as to whether this entire 
provision constitutes undue meddling, at least where the client knowl-
edgeably consents and the total fee is reasonable. This is particularly 
crucial among many trial counsel whose practice consists primarily 
of referral work. Such specialists have become increasingly necessary 
because of the notorious contraction in the number of able trial advo-
cates. Limiting the division of fees in "proportion to the services per-
formed and responsibility assumed by each" would necessarily be a 
matter of hindsight, would complicate the negotiations after the fact, 
and would compound the business aspects by the ethical considerations 
introduced by the Code. 
Serious questions are also inherent in the rule concerning repre-
sentation of a client within the bounds of the law, with regard to the 
disclosure of a client's fraud on a person or tribunal.2B Under that rule, 
a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that 
His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a 
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his 
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to 
do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal. 
[Emphasis added.]29 
It would appear that the underscored portion of the rule creates an 
affirmative duty of disclosure with problems akin to those requiring 
that an attorney report any violations of the rules by another attorney. 
Aside from the fact that an attorney's duties as an "informer" relate 
to a client's fraud, as compared with a brother attorney's negligence, 
even "fraud" is such an all-encompassing term that one may question 
if, in fact, society's welfare requires such policing of a client by his 
27 DR 2-I07(A)(l)-(3). 
28 DR 7-I02(B)(l). 
29 Ibid. 
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own attorney. By contrast, it may be recalled that large segments of the 
bar voiced grave protest when the director of the FBI suggested that 
attorneys had such an affirmative duty of reporting a client's conduct 
of a treasonous nature. Weighing such a new principle against the 
well-established doctrine of absolute confidence between client and 
attorney, it is to be doubted that such a drastic remedy should be re-
quired even in case of a serious fraud. There will be many who would 
suggest that, at most, an attorney's duty at that juncture would call 
for his termination of representation, lest he become a participant in 
the fraud. Even so, it might then be asked whether the proposed rule 
would not effectively bar a fraudulent client from obtaining competent 
legal services.30 At the very least, clients would be entitled to a forth-
right declaration of such a stringent rule prior to their entrapment by 
the only expert whom society has provided for confidential disclosure 
and advice. Although some may differ, a balancing of such considera-
tions would appear to indicate that this rule has exceeded the fair 
limits of ethical conduct. 
Finally, in the broadest frame of reference, the drafters o£ the Code 
have seemingly sought to legislate on a matter o£ grave importance to 
society as a whole, namely, the means of providing efficient and reason-
ably priced legal services for the great majorities in the middle class. 
While taking cognizance of the fact that the wealthy are well repre-
sented and that direct or indirect provision o£ services for the needy 
are laudable, the rules would severely restrict a lawyer's participation 
in offices or organizations designed to provide legal services for its 
members.s1 While excepting from the prohibition such offices as legal 
aid, public defender, military legal assistance, and bar association 
referral services, the crucial exception for the general public would 
hew as closely as possible to the exemption allowed by the Supreme 
Court in a series of recent cases involving the provision by labor unions 
or certain social services organizations of free personal legal services 
for their members.a2 
The narrow scope of this permitted exception is most evident in the 
severity of the condition that such activity will be allowed 
... only in those instances and to the extent that controlling con-
stitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the ser-
vices requires the allowance of such legal service activities, and 
only if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such inter-
pretation, are met: 
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include 
the rendition of legal services. 
so Cf. Canon 2 regarding the duty to "make legal counsel available." 
31 DR 2-103(D). 
32 United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brother· 
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415 (1963). 
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(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services 
to its members is incidental and reasonably related to the pri-
mary purposes of such organization. 
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the 
rendition of legal services by the lawyer. 
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal :services are 
rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client 
of the lawyer in that matter.83 
Such begrudging concessions to the Constitution itself, limited to 
the interpretation in effect at the time of the rendering of the legal 
services and with the clearly implicit hope of a narrowing of the 
doctrines already enunciated, reflect a "bare bones" approach that 
would shame a vulture. Not content with the severity of the self-
interest evident in the general statement of the rule, the drafters 
sought to foreclose any seepage by providing the four additional con-
ditions. It is, indeed, difficult to escape the impression that, given the 
power, the ABA would have reversed the Supreme Court, heedless of 
the broad social implications of the Court's rulings in this highly 
sensitive area. 
For it is obvious that aside from services for the wealthy and possibly 
the poor, the broad spectrum of middle America has been econom-
ically foreclosed from reasonable access to competent legal services of 
a general practitioner, let alone the services of the specialist given such 
deference in Disciplinary Rule 6-lOl(A)(l) discussed above. In a 
society of ever-increasing sophistication, it is distressing to note that, 
except in such necessitous circumstances as a criminal charge, an auto 
tort, a conveyance, or an estate, tens of millions never see a law office 
in their lifetime. Persons with annual incomes of $7500 to $20,000, 
probably with a spouse and two or more children headed for college, 
can hardly afford cash fees of $500 or more, frequently the minimum 
requirement for competent advice even on business matters with 
limited complications. 
Quite possibly, this economic problem may require a restructuring 
of established patterns, ranging from extended credit plans to prepay-
ment insurance programs or even legal clinics supported in whole or 
in part by governmental funds. It can hardly be thought that the need 
of such citizens for legal services is any less than that of the labor 
union members covered by the Supreme Court decisions. And rather 
than panic at the thought of such an imagined threat to the profes-
sion, lawyers might well find a severe shortage of counsel to meet the 
demands of such tens of millions of new clients. One may also specu-
late that from a completely selfish viewpoint, the rapid growth of the 
custom of having salaried corporate counsel may presage far more 
88 DR 2-IO!J(D)(5). 
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financial damage to independent practitioners, yet no murmur has 
been heard on that front. 
The basic criticism of the rule lies in its foreclosure of discussion 
and debate by all of society, comparable to that which occurred in 
recent efforts to solve similar medical cost problems. The almost un-
heralded adoption of the rules by the ABA and already by 12 states, 
undoubtedly with many more to follow, would become legally bind-
ing except for congressional action or a constitutional ruling by the 
Supreme Court. It may well be asked whether such conduct by the bar 
constitutes a per se violation of Canon 9, requiring that "A lawyer 
should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." 
Although this discussion has been confined to some of the more con-
troversial provisions of the new Code, to large segments of the bar 
there would appear ample justification for vigorous action to defeat 
its adoption and certainly to subject it to drastic amendment. But 
much more womd seem to. be involved. 
While proponents of the Code might consider this exposition little 
more than a defense of mediocrity, the illustrations intended to high-
light the deficiencies of the Code are in defense of tenets fundamental 
to the protection of a free society. Though few could quarrel with the 
Canons themselves, their implementation in the Disciplinary Rules 
demonstrates such insensitivity to the basic rights of both attorney 
and client that many will demand a total revision. For those who may 
now or hereafter be subject to such rules of conduct, this discussion 
will have served a useful purpose if only to make them aware of its 
draconian concepts. 
II. INTRODUCTION OF THE CODE INTO THE 
MASSACHUSETTS ENVIRONMENT AS 
PRESENSITIZED BY MATTER 
OF BAILEY 
JERRY COHEN 
The first regular attorney practicmg in Massachusetts was 
Thomas Lechford. He had been educated for the bar in England. 
JERRY CoHEN is a patent attorney for Norton Company and a member of the 
Board of Governors of the Boston Patent Law Association. Mr. Cohen is repre-
senting the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts in opposition to certain provi-
sions of the Code. He is also a member of the American, Massachusetts and Boston 
Bar Associations. These affiliations are cited to reveal possible bias; but the opinions 
expressed in this article are not necessarily shared by any of the organizations 
named, except to the extent specifically attributed to them. 
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He came in 1637 and settled in Boston. It is said that he argued 
and disputed with the magistrates so much that he rendered 
himself unpopular. In 1639, he was disbarred, his offense being 
that he went to the jury and pleaded with them out of court-
what we should call tampering with the jury. Owing to his mis-
conduct, the profession fell into disrepute and a law was passed 
in 1641 prohibiting the payment of a fee or reward for the 
services of an attorney.* 
In 1689 the secretary to the Governor of Massachusetts wrote 
to England asking for "two, or three, honest attorneys (if any 
such thing in nature)."t 
§29.3. Introduction. Two events of the 1970 SuRvEY year have 
evoked active reconsideration of ethical standards for lawyers in 
Massachusetts. The Boston Bar Association played a catalytic role 
in both events. The first was what may be termed an exercise in 
natural law ethics.1 In a lawyer discipline proceeding initiated by 
an information2 filed by the Boston Bar Association, the respondent 
was censured for several incidents of unethical conduct occurring 
over the past six years.3 The information recited facts relating to 
several acts of pretrial, pending trial and posttrial publicity by re-
spondent and asked the Court to take such action as it deemed meet 
and just under the circumstances. The second event was the filing by 
the Boston Bar Association of a petition with the Supreme Judicial 
Court4 to adopt the Code of Professional Responsibility as adopted 
by the American Bar Association [ABA] House of Delegates in August, 
1969 or with such modifications as the Court might deem advisable. 
" H.R. Bailey, Attorneys and Their Admission to the Bar 12 (1907). The "law" 
cited is Article 26 of the Body of Liberties and has since been repealed. 
t Warren, A History of the American Bar 73 (1911). 
§29.3. 1 "This expression, 'natural law,' or jus naturale, was lar1~ely used in the 
philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, and was 
intended to denote a system of rules and principles for the guidance of human 
conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one 
people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and would be 
found to grow out of and conform to his nature, meaning by that word his 
whole mental, moral, and physical constitution." Black's Law Dictionary 1177 (4th 
ed. 1951). · 
2 A lawyer discipline proceeding "is commenced not by a petition for disbar· 
ment but rather by an information wherein the matters there set forth are 
brought to the attention of the court with a prayer, not for disbarment or other 
specific disciplinary action, but rather for such action as the court may deem fit." 
Matter of Santosuosso, 318 Mass. 489, 491, 62 N.E.2d 105, 106 (1945). 
3 In the Matter of F. Lee Bailey, Supreme Judicial Court for the County of 
Suffolk, No. 69934 Law (Sept. 16, 1970). 
4 Petition to Adopt the Canons and Disciplinary Rules in the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility Adopted by the American Bar Association,. Supreme Judi-
cial Court for the County of Suffolk, No. 69760 Equity (hereinafter cited as Code 
Petition]. 
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That Code, if adopted, would provide a "positive law"5 framework for 
resolution of all questions of legal "ethics." 
§29.4. Natural law ethics. In Massachusetts the principal basis of 
ethical standards has been assumed to be a common set of right-
reason values to which all right-thinking attorneys would naturally 
subscribe.1 This view of ethics reduces to redundancy or irrelevance 
statutes or official rules proscribing certain impermissible conduct2 
and can reduce the burden of due process- in regard to notice of 
an offense- to be carried by the enforcing authorities. Massachusetts 
has never officially adopted the old ABA Canons of Professional 
Ethics, although the old Canons were adopted in 1964 by the Massa-
chusetts Bar Association (MBA), a voluntary association (Massachusetts 
does not have an integrated bar).3 The old Canons are informal guides 
in disciplinary proceedings in court, but are not relied upon as the 
basis for finding a violation of ethical norms.4 
§29.5. Pre-emption of common law ethics by positive law ethics: 
Procedural due process. It is likely that some variation of the ABA 
Code will be adopted in Massachusetts. It is also likely that, with 
5 "Law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper authority for the 
government of an organized jural society." Black's Law Dictionary 1324 (4th ed. 
1951). 
§29.4. 1 "[M]embers of a bar can be assumed to know that certain kinds of 
conduct, generally condemned by responsible men, will be grounds for disbarment. 
. . . It . . . includes conduct which all responsible attorneys would recognize as 
improper for a member of the profession." In the Matter of F. Lee Bailey, Su-
preme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk, No. 69934 Law (Sept. 16, 1970), 5, 
Kirk, J., quoting from JUstice White's concurring opinion in In re Ruffalo, 390 
U.S. 544, 555 (1968). See generally Adlow, Lemuel Shaw and the Common Law, 
41 B.U.L. Rev. I (1961), for an interesting analysis of the essential harmony between 
natural and positive law shaped by the Supreme Judicial Court in the nineteenth 
century. But for another view on the utility of right-reason, see Holmes, Natural 
Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1918). 
2 The question of reliance on statutory standards goes deeper since the exercise 
of disciplinary control by the legislature is apparently the exercise of judicial 
power contrary to the proscription of the Declaration of Rights, art. 30. A consti-
tutional crisis over this separation of powers issue is finessed by characterizing the 
statutes as being in aid oi the judicial branch. See Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 
607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932). See also Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary 
Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276 (1928). 
3 An integrated bar is one in which membership is mandatory and to which the 
bar as supervising authority delegates much power. In 1947 the Supreme Judicial 
Court dismissed without prejudice a petition to establish an integrated bar in the 
Commonwealth. Matter of an Integrated Bar, 321 Mass. 747, 74 N.E.2d 140 (1947). 
Although the MBA, along with other bar organizations, opposed this concept, it 
has recently filed a petition to establish an integrated bar. On December 3, 1970, 
the Supreme Judicial Court issued an Order of Notice addressed to all attorneys 
solid ting their views. 
4 The old Canons are said to provide "illumination" of the views of the bar 
although they have no "statutory force." Matter of Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 487, 159 
N.E. 495, 496 (1928). Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 613, 194 N.E. 313, 
317 (1935): "They [attorneys] are bound by canons of ethics ... which are enforced 
by the courts" (citing Cohen). 
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limited exceptions,1 the specific provisions of the Code'& disciplinary 
rules will pre-empt the Bailey standard of what all lawyers should 
know. 
In Bailey, the special counsel designated to manage the proceeding2 
argued that such proceeding was in the nature of an inquest and that 
technicalities of legal procedure were inappropriate.s The Court 
agreed, notwithstanding the recent Kennedy decision4 which made it 
clear that at least some elements of due process are appropriate for 
inquests. The Bailey situation would seem even more compelling than 
the Kennedy situation for in Kennedy, the respondent could expect 
that, at worst, the inquest would be followed by a trial affording full 
due process protections. In Bailey, however, inquest and trial (and 
punishment) were compressed into a single proceeding. The single 
Justice, with the aid of designated counsel, found that the facts 
alleged in the information (which respondent had admitted were 
true) constituted a breach of an allegedly extant standard of "prima 
facie impropriety." The Justice, as a consequence of this finding, 
denied respondent's motions for a bill of particulars; barred re-
spondent from introducing opinion evidence of leading Massachu-
setts attorneys as to the prevailing ethical standard; found that re-
spondent did not overcome the "prima facie impropriety" shown in 
the information; and imposed punishment. The charge of Star-Cham-
ber may be too harsh, but it is fair to say that this type of proceeding 
is the stuff of which Kafkaesque nightmares are made. 
The instant case emphasizes the need for reconsideration of the 
procedural aspects of disciplinary hearings. Foundations are being 
established for a future holding that the rigorous procedural require-
ments of a criminal proceeding be made applicable to a disciplinary 
proceeding. In In re Gauft,5 the United States Supreme Court applied 
fundamentals of due process to a juvenile proceeding of a "quasi-
criminal" character. In Spevack v. Klein,6 the Court reversed a lawyer 
§29.5. 1 The exceptions would be vague provisions within the Code itself, e.g., 
"moral turpitude" (DR l-l02(A)(3)). Such standards could conceivably be applied in 
a wide variety of situations. See, e.g., State v. Bieber, 121 Kan. 536, 247 P. 875 
(1926), wherein an attorney was disbarred for operating a home still during pro-
hibition. 
2 The role of designated counsel was anomalous. The petitioner (Boston Bar 
Association) was not a party to the proceeding. See Boston Bar Association v. Casey, 
211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751 (1912). Nor did designated counsel represent the Com-
monwealth, the bar, the "people" or the court. Counsel could take discovery 
without yielding any. 
3 In the Matter of F. Lee Bailey, Supreme Judicial Court for the County of 
Suffolk, No. 69934 Law (Sept. 16, 1970), Memorandum (of Designated Counsel) 
In Opposition to Dilatory Pleadings (of Respondent). See also Boston Bar Associ-
ation v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 191, 97 N.E. 751, 753 (1912). 
4 Kennedy v. Justice of the District Court of Dukes County, 356 Mass. 367, 252 
N.E.2d 201 (1969). This case is the subject of a student note, §28.8, supra. 
5 387 u.s. 1 (1967). 
6 385 U.S. 511 (1967), overruling Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). 
15
Brown: Chapter 29: ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
§29.5 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 745 
discipline ruling based on a lawyer's failure to answer bar committee 
questions.7 The next step was In Re Ruffalo}s holding that a lawyer 
could not be disbarred as the result of a proceeding which gave in-
adequate notice of the standard of conduct violated,9 the charge 
having been made midway in the proceeding. There is, however, 
another aspect of due process which was inadequately treated by the 
Ruffalo majority. This is the problem of due notice of a standard of 
conduct so that all prudent men can order their affairs to avoid any 
practice which might expose them to punitive sanctions. The con-
curring opinion of Justice White in Ruffalo did reach this question: 
[I] ... a federal court may not deprive an attorney of ... his 
profession on the basis of a determination after the fact that 
conduct is unethical if responsible attorneys would differ in 
appraising the propriety of that conduct. 
[2] ... members of a bar can be assumed to know that certain 
kinds of conduct ... will be grounds for disbarment .... 
[This] also includes conduct which all responsible attorneys 
would recognize as improper .... 
[3] I express no opinion about whether . . . specific rules . . . 
could proscribe the conduct for which petitioner was dis-
barred.10 
Part [2] of the foregoing was applied in Bailey} but the possible ap-
plication of part [I] was treated superficially and part [3] was ig-
nored. 
7 Depending upon the lawyer-defendant's answers to a bar committee, he could 
have been prosecuted criminally by tax authorities. But the Court did not rest on 
this narrow factual ground; rather the decision was based on the "quasi-criminal" 
character of the disbarment proceeding per se and the loss of reputation and 
livelihood which would result from disbarment. Hence the punitive nature of the 
proceeding required allowance of the Fifth Amendment right of silence. 
8 390 u.s. 544, 555-556. 
9 The Court reversed the disbarment of an Ohio lawyer from Ohio federal court 
practice for lack of due process. The disbarment was based, inter alia, on the law-
yer's having paid a moonlighting B & 0 railroad employee for assistance in the 
investigation of railroad accident cases, including some involving the B & 0 rail-
road. The Ohio Supreme Court, acting in a parallel state court disbarment pro-
ceeding and speaking in obvious high dudgeon at the respondent's failure to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his action, said: "[O]ne who believes that 
it is proper to employ and pay another to work against the interests of his regular 
employer is not qualified to be a member of the Ohio Bar." Mahoning County 
Bar Assn. v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 269, 199 N.E.2d 396, 401 (1964). No statute, 
rule or canon was cited; the proposition was self-evident to the Ohio court. 
10 390 U.S. 544, 555-556, discussed in Kaufman, The Lawyers' New Code, 22 
Harv. L.S. Bull. 19, 37 (1970): "[T]here are some categories of conduct for which 
there can be disciplinary action even though there is only a general prohibitory 
rule in the [old] Canons, or no rule at all, but when one gets into a doubtful area 
there must be specificity- and Ruffalo is such a case." It is likely that practices 
in the "doubtful area" occur more frequently than those blatant violations of 
common law ethical standards. 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 32
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/32
746 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §29.6 
In Massachusetts, fundamental procedural fairness is reluctantly 
conceded as a minimum requirement for proceedings of the type 
conducted in Bailey. 11 However, the standards of due process are far 
below those that obtain in a criminal proceeding. The line is drawn 
at those procedural rights accorded civil litigants- and there with 
some qualifications.12 The basic trend of the above cited United 
States Supreme Court decisions appears to be towards application of 
the due process requirements of a criminal proceeding to a bar disci-
pline proceeding.1s 
The new ABA Code contains many specific provisions covering 
the full range of ethical questions from fraud and chicane to letterheads 
and calling cards. It should provide a vehicle for such basic tenets 
of due process as notice of the standards of conduct to be observed 
and of the nature of a specific offense when a charge is filed. 
§29.6. Drafting, approving and adopting the new Code. From 
1964 through 1969 the ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of 
Ethical Standards examined the old Canons and concluded that revi-
sion was necessary in four particulars: 
(1) ... There are important areas involving the conduct of law-
yers that are [inadequately covered by the old] Canons; 
(2) Many Canons that are sound in substance are in need of 
editorial revision; 
(3) Most of the Canons do not lend themselves to practical sanc-
tions for violations; and 
11 Matter of Santosuosso, 318 Mass. 489, 62 N.E.2d 105 (1934). Cf. Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Whatever the qualitative defects in procedure 
in the Commonwealth, there is no lack of quantity. In Boston Bar Association v. 
Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751 (1912), a lawyer discipline proceeding, there were 
six different appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court: 196 Mass. 100, 81 N.E. 892 
(1907); 204 Mass. 331, 90 N.E. 584 (1910); 211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751 (1912); 213 
Mass. 549, 100 N.E. 658 (1913); 227 Mass. 46, ll6 N.E. 541 (1917); Casey v. Justice 
of the Superior Court, 229 Mass. 200, 118 N.E. 297 (1918). 
12 Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 197, 47 N.E.2d 12, 22 (1943): "Though this 
court has consistently described ... proceedings for disbarment as proceedings at 
law, it has with equal consistency ... recognized that proceedings for disbarment 
are not in the strict sense actions at law subject to all the procedural requirements 
applicable to such an action." See also Matter of Santosuosso, 318 Mass. 489, 491, 
494-495, 62 N.E.2d 105, 106, 108 (not civil, not equity). In Bailey, respondent argued 
unsuccessfully that Ruffalo required an overruling of Keenan and a holding that 
the appropriate standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than "pre-
ponderance of the evidence." In the Matter of F. Lee Bailey, Supreme Judicial 
Court for the County of Suffolk, No. 69934 Law (Sept. 16, 1970), Memorandum (of 
Designated Council) In Opposition to Dilatory Pleadings (of Respondent). 
13 The decisions noted above speak in terms of fundamental legal protections. 
However, the definition of fundamental is seen to move toward the full protec-
tion of procedural fairness, notwithstanding the pejorative appellations, namely, 
"legal niceties" and "technicalities," or "formal requirements." See Malinski v. 
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945): "The history of American freedom is, in no 
small measure, the history of procedure" (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
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(4) Changed ... conditions in our legal system and urbanized 
society require new statements of professional principles1 
The committee also concluded that mere amendment would not 
suffi.ce.2 "A new Code of Professional Responsibility could be the only 
answer."3 The committee drafted such a Code and after extensive 
consultation and prudent compromise secured passage of the Code by 
the ABA House of Delegates in August, 1969.4 Another special com-
mittee was appointed to secure approval and adoption of the Code in 
all states. 5 
The Code is structured in three separate major parts: (a) nine 
Canons which are statements of axiomatic norms; (b) 138 separate 
paragraph statements of Ethical Considerations, subsumed under the 
various canons and elaborating the issues involved therein; and (c) 
39 numbered Disciplinary Rules (with lettered subdivisions expanding 
the actual number of regulations to several hundred) also subsumed 
under the various canons and expressing mandatory minimum stan-
dards of acceptable conduct. Ancillary to these basic features are 
a preface, a preamble, a set of definitions, and a preliminary state-
ment. There are also 361 footnotes keyed into the Ethical Considera-
tions and Disciplinary Rules. 
As of the end of 1970, the Code has been adopted in 24 states 
through specific action of the respective state supreme courts acting 
in their rule-making capacity or through automatic approval under 
integrated bar rules.6 It has been approved by the major bar associa-
tions in an additional twelve states and the District of Columbia as 
a prelude to official adoption there. In addition, the California Su-
preme Court acted on new rules proposed by the integrated bar of 
that state respecting availability of legal services- a major issue of 
the ABA Code. Twenty-one of the states made no changes to the Code 
(other than the minor amendments made to conform to amendments 
made in 1970 by the ABA) while 15 states and the District of Columbia 
made significant modifications.7 
In Massachusetts, the Boston Bar Association received a report 
§29.6. 1 Preface, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility [the new Code will 
hereinafter be referred to as the Code]. 
2 90 A.B.A. Rep. 221 (1965). 
3 Code Preface. 
4 55 A.B.A.]. 970 (1969). See the articles of the committee's chairman and re-
porter, respectively: Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History 
and Objectives, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (1970); Sutton, The American Bar Association 
Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 Texas L. Rev. 255 
(1970). 
IS 55 A.B.A.J. 893 (1969). 
6 16 American Bar News, No. I at 17 (Jan., 1971). 
1 Code Petition Proceeding, Substitute Statement of Agreed Facts, Supreme Ju-
dicial Court for the County of Suffolk, No. 69760 Equity at 2-3, and Appendix B. 
The 1970 amendments by the ABA are set out in Appendix A of the same docu-
ment. 
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from its Grievance Committee on January 8, 1970, favoring adoption 
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. On February 5, 1970, 
the governing council for the association voted to file a petition in 
the Supreme Judicial Court praying that the Court adopt the Canons 
and Disciplinary Rules (but not the Ethical Considerations) with such 
modifications as the Court might deem advisable. These efforts paral-
leled consideration of the Code by the Massachusetts Ba:r Association 
(MBA). As a feature of its mid-winter meeting, the MBA held a panel 
discussion on the Code on January 30, 1970. The MBA also called 
a special meeting on the Code for January 31, 1970. Rather than ap-
prove the Code at that time, the special meeting voted to have the 
president appoint an ad hoc committee for further review, which was 
done on February 12, 1970 when President Sisk appointed a committee 
on professional responsibility, to be chaired by Professor A. James 
Casner of the Harvard Law School. In April the committee made 
its report, recommending adoption of the Code with certain amend-
ments. The June 6, 1970 annual meeting decided not to endorse the 
committee report, but rather to refer it to a postcard poll of the MBA 
membership. The meeting also rejected motions (a) to reject the 
Code with or without changes (21-48 vote); (b) to refer the matter 
back to committee; and (c) to review each canon of the Code. (The 
postcard poll results were 928 favoring adoption with the committee's 
proposed amendments, 161 favoring adoption without amendment, 
and 155 opposing adoption under any circumstances.)8 
The Supreme Judicial Court acted quickly on the petition of the 
Boston Bar Association; 9 the Court referred the petition to a single 
Justice who issued an Order of Notice on April 9, 1970, inviting any 
member of the bar to show cause, at a hearing set for October 22, 
1970, as to why the petition should not be granted. It also instructed 
petitioner and clerks of the Superior Court in each county to serve 
notice of the order on all members of the bar. The MBA contributed 
yeomanlike service to the effort to notify the bar, with the result 
that virtually all lawyers in the Commonwealth were provided with a 
copy of the Order of Notice and a copy of the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The Supreme Judicial Court's prompt action on 
the petition caught the MBA somewhat short and forced an accelera-
tion of, and loss of flexibility in, what had been up to the time of isssue 
of the Order of Notice a commendable course of speedy but careful 
consideration of the Code.to 
s Id. at 9. 
9 In contrast, the Court withheld consideration of the contemporaneous peti-
tions of the MBA and Massachusetts Law Reform Institute for app10ximately nine 
months before reactivation. 
10 The upshot was open dispute between the MBA and the Boston Bar Associ-
ation, which will probably result in delay of adoption of the Code. In contrast, 
joint presentation by the two associations of a compromise version of a prospec-
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There was very little response to the Order of Notice. In addition 
to the counsel and the presidents of the Boston Bar Association and 
the MBA, only four other attorneys appeared at the October 22, 1970 
hearing. The distinguished counsel for petitioner felt that the re-
sponse was adequate and suggested in informal colloquy in open 
court that the diversity of interests represented by those appearing 
would be sufficient representation if the instant proceeding were 
analogized to a class action. The counsel for the Civil Liberties Union 
of Massachusetts suggested the need for a quasi-legislative rather than 
a judicial approach to the proceeding. Another party suggested the 
need for "expert" testimony on the public policy issues underlying 
the Code. The "case" then progressed substantially in the form of a 
matter in equity. 
A "Statement of Agreed Facts" narrating the actions by the ABA 
and the two leading Massachusetts bar associations in approving 
the Code, and actions of other states in approving andfor adopting 
the Code, was prepared by those appearing in the proceeding, with 
technical assistance from the ABA Special Committee to secure adop-
tion of the Code. The single Justice, treating the Statement as a 
"case stated," reported the case to the full bench for hearing in 1971. 
The MBA, the largest bar association in Massachusetts, seeks to 
modify the Code by: (a) eliminating DR 7-102B and DR l-103A re-
quiring every attorney to inform on fraud by his client and on rule-
breaking or other undesirable conduct by his brother attorneys; (b) 
eliminating DR 2-102B, which states that the name of a lawyer who 
leaves his firm for a limited time to serve in public office must be 
deleted from the firm name; (c) modifying the rules imposing sanc-
tions for the charging of exorbitant fees (DR 72-l06B) and governing 
contingent fees (DR 2-106C); (d) reducing the duty of care of the 
lawyer regarding acts of his employees relating to clients' confidences 
(DR 4-lOlD); (e) reducing the scope of DR 5-lOlB and DR 5-l02A 
which bar a lawyer from representation where he may be called as 
a witness in a case; (f) omitting DR 6-101 imposing sanctions for 
lawyer incompetence; (g) omitting DR 7-l06C4 which proscribes an 
attorney's expressing his personal opinion to court or jury as to the 
justness of his cause, credibility of a witness, culpability of a court 
litigant or guilt or innocence of a criminal accused; and (h) modify-
ing DR 2-l07A2 concerning fee-splitting.U The petitioner (Boston 
Bar Association) in effect amended its petition to the extent of 
joining with the MBA wholly as to points (b) and (c) and partially as 
tive rule secured adoption by the Supreme Judicial Court as present Rule 3:18 
(relating to law firm professional corporations) within two weeks of the filing of 
the petition. 
11 Code Petition Proceeding, note 7 supra, Memorandum of the Massachusetts 
Bar Association. The MBA also advanced the 1970 ABA Amendments and other 
minor changes. 
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to points (a) and (e) and disagreeing with the MBA wholly as to points 
(d), (f), (g) and (h).12 
It is interesting to note that several of the MBA's pleas for amend-
ment represent a retrogression from the standards of the present 
Canons of Professional Ethics. The Boston Bar Association was 
quick to point this out in opposing the amendments,l3 but was ju-
dicious enough not to raise the point that the MBA had itself ap-
proved the present Canons of Ethics in 1964. This contradiction 
merits note here to show that the Code drafting and adoption ac-
tions have injected controversy and searching concern into what had 
been a dormant issue in the Commonwealth. The Bailey case had the 
same effect.a 
§29.7. The public policy issues of legal ethics: Substantive due 
process. The broad police powers of a state to regulate professions 
in their economic aspects,1 buttressed by the compelling interest in the 
orderly administration of justice,2 can support properly promulgated 
regulations which limit the exercise of the liberty and property rights 
of lawyers.a However, the scope of police power is more circumscribed 
when it impinges on clients' constitutional freedoms. This is illus-
trated by the example of the evolution of that body of law in the 
area which produces most ethical questions- the bringing together 
of lawyer and client. 
Proposals for increasing the availability of legal services to the 
middle class include more efficient law practices, larger practice units, 
specialization, use of paraprofessionals, recovery of lawyers' fees by 
12 As for the other parties, Harold Brown, Esq., opposes adoption of the Code; 
Professor Livingston Hall of Harvard Law School and Elwynn Miller, Esq., sup· 
port adoption. Messrs. Brown and Hall oppose the informer rule, while the latter 
supports the ban on an advocate's personal opinion. The Civil Liberties Union 
of Massachusetts opposes the Code's restrictive approach to group legal practice, 
trial publicity and zealous advocacy. 
13 Code Petition Proceeding, note 7 supra, Boston Bar Association Memorandum 
In Support of Adoption of the Canons, and, With Certain Modifications, the 
Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility Heretofore Adopted 
by the American Bar Association, at 10, 18, 20, 24, 28. 
14 Petitioner Boston Bar Association buttressed its argument with citation of the 
Bailey case at three separate points in its Memorandum. Id. at 10, 17, 26. 
§29.7. 1 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 
(1955). See also Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massa-
chusetts, 41 B.U.L. Rev. 157 (1961). 
2 It is unusual to speak of a court's establishment of rules to expedite its 
operations as an exercise of "police power," but this term seems appropriate when 
one considers that the scope of such rules governs attorney conduct outside the 
court, including the attorney's personal life. 
3 The right of a lawyer to practice law (so long as he behaves) is his liberty 
and property protected under Mass. Const. arts. I and 10 of the Declaration of 
Rights. against unwarrantable interference. The lawyer cannot be deprived of it 
except by proceedings complying with due process of law. Matter of Sleeper, 251 
Mass. 6, 18-19, 146 N.E. 269, 274 (1925). See also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 
(1866). 
21
Brown: Chapter 29: ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
§29.7 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 751 
successful litigants, legal service insurance, subsidies, better lawyer 
referral services, relaxation of restrictions on business-getting activi-
ties, special law offices for clients of moderate means and "group legal 
services."4 Each offends traditional values to some degree, but none is 
so controversial as the "group legal services" proposal.5 Stated simply, 
the group legal services concept (also known as "intermediary ar-
rangements") involves a third party's recommending or furnish-
ing a lawyer to a client andfor paying the lawyer for his 
services to the client so referred.6 The bar, considering this arrange-
ment, sees inherent dangers of conflict of interest, advertising, solici-
tation and ambulance chasing, champerty and maintenance, barratry, 
assembly-line methods, lowering of the dignity of the profession and 
its standards of competence, and price cutting. Such arrangements 
have been consistently attacked even before the supposed dangers 
materialized.7 Militant bar opposition produced injunctions against 
the legal service activities of automobile clubs and professional, labor 
and business organizations in the 1930s.8 Liability and title insurers 
survived the onslaught.9 
Notwithstanding this strident opposition, the seeds of regeneration 
of the group legal services concept were also planted in the 1930s. 
4 All elaborated upon in Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means 
(1970), an analytical-polemical review of the problem, with copious bibliography. 
As to the underlying need for such services, see 43 J. State Bar Calif. 474 (1968), 
and 39 id. 639 (1964). 
5 See generally Drinker, Legal Ethics 161-167 (1953). 
6 See Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means, c. VII (1970). Cady, 
The Future of Group Legal Services, 55 A.B.A.J. 421 (1969) (pro); Voorhees, Group 
Legal Services and the Public Interest, 55 A.B.A.J. 534 (1969) (pro); and Pitts, 
Group Legal Services: A Plan to Huckster Professional Services, 55 A.B.A.J. 621 
(1969) (con). 
7 The tendency is to posit the assumption that all these evils go with group 
legal services and then assume that any organization which can be semantically 
saddled with the term "group legal services" generates these evils. The modern 
development of the overbreadth or less-drastic-alternative doctrine in constitutional 
law has forced a shifting of the burden of proof. 
s See, e.g., Rhode Island Bar Assn. v. Automobile Service Assn., 55 R.I. 122, 179 
A. 139 (1935); People ex rei. Chicago Bar Assn. v. The Chicago Motor Club, 362 
Ill. 50, 199 N.E. I (1935); In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Matter of 
Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936) (compare Matter of 
Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N.E.2d 749 (1936)); People ex rei. Courtney v. Assn. 
of Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933). See also 
Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935) (barring legislation 
allowing group practice). Most of the decisions are padded out around the 
shibboleth that a corporation cannot practice law. This was a false issue, according 
to Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law- A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus, 
2 Md. L. Rev. 342 (1938). See also Drinker, Legal Ethics 167 (1953): "The 
real argument against [approval of group legal services] by the bar is believed to 
be loss of income to the lawyers and concentration of service in hands of fewer 
lawyers. These features do not commend the profession to the public." 
9 See Drinker, id. at ll4: "Obviously the insertion in the policy of a provision 
requiring the insured to permit the insurance company's lawyer to defend is 
consent in advance obviating improper conflict of interest .... " 
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Decisions of courts and bar association ethics committees upheld 
various legal aid and other pro bono publico arrangements of a 
nonprofit nature, including the activities of the Liberty League, a 
group offering free legal services to "victims" of the New Deal.1° 
These precedents provided a logical basis for NAACP v. Buttonp 
in which the United States Supreme Court struck down Virginia's 
antisolicitation laws as applied to the civil rights litigating activities 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
A year later, the constitutionally protected scope of group legal 
services was expanded in Brotherhood of Railroad Tra£nmen v. Vir-
ginia State BarP when the Court afforded similar protection to an 
arrangement in which a union arranged a discount in contingent fee 
arrangements and recommended lawyers to union members for prose-
cution of their claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
Those who had read Button and Trainmen merely as protections for 
the assertion of federal rights were disabused of this narrow reading 
by the subsequent case, United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. 
Illinois State Bar Assn.p protecting an arrangement in which a union's 
salaried attorney-employees represented union members in prosecu-
tion of their personal injury claims under state law. 
This trilogy of cases substantially overlapped in time the five-year 
effort of the American Bar Association to modernize the old Canons of 
Ethics into a Code of Professional Responsibility. In January, 1969, 
·the ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards 
published a preliminary draft of the Code which included provisions 
legitimizing the group legal service activities of: 
(1) legal aid or public defender offices; 
(2) military legal service offices; 
(3) lawyer referral services; 
(4) bar associations; and 
(5) a professional association, trade association or other nonprofit 
organization. 
This was apparently too much reform for the American Bar Associa-
tion. The final draft of the Code which was adopted by the ABA 
House of Delegates in August, 1969, legitimized the group legal 
service activities of the first four of the above, but modified the last 
to read: 
Any other non-profit organization . . . but only in those in-
stances and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpre-
10 Approved, ABA Ethic:s Opinion No. 148 (1935). See Comment, 36 Colum. L. 
Rev. 993 (1936). 
11 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 
76 Yale L.J. 966 (1967). 
12 377 U.S, I, rehearing denied, 377 t,T.S. 960 (1964). 
13 389 u.s. 217 (1967}. 
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uition ~ · . requires the allowance of such legal service activities 
This approach of the final draft has been characterized as at worst 
patently unconstitutionaP4 and at best "a bare bones approach that 
would shame a vulture."15 
It appears that the ABA's regression will be no more than a tem-
porary setback to the cause of group legal services. California, Oregon 
and the District of Columbia are adopting standards corresponding 
more nearly to those of the preliminary draft than of the final draft. 
In addition, Wisconsin has been the scene of a major Judicare ex-
periment. There has been no clear indication of the sentiment of the 
bar or general public in Massachusetts regarding group legal services . 
. The substantive issue raised in Bailey (relating to trial publicity) 
will probably rank second only to "business getting" as the most 
controversial ethics issue of this decade. It is ironic that the respondent 
in Bailey, disciplined for trying his defense of criminal cases in the 
press, has to his credit the education of this country as to standards 
for prosecutors through his successful "prejudicial publicity" plea in 
Sheppard v. Maxwell. 16 After Sheppard, an ABA special committee 
struck an equitable balance between conflicting First Amendment 
and Sixth Amendment demands in its. Reardon Rules17 (most of the 
facts complained of in Bailey happened before adoption of the Rear-
don Rules by any bar association or official body). 
The Code extends the Reardon Rules to civil litigation and ad-
ministrative proceedings.1B In these areas, First Amendment freedoms 
are invaded without the countervailing consideration of protecting 
Sixth Amendment rights. The Pandora's box thus opened contains 
such ingredients as a corporation lawyer's participation in drafting 
or editing a corporate annual report, registration statement, or news 
release which characterizes an insurance commission's rate freeze or· 
der as confiscatory.l9 If the lawyer (or the client, aided by the lawyer) 
is, in the words of the favored cliche, "trying his case in the press," it 
is because there are two separate trials involved for the client- the 
court trial and the public opinion trial. The latter may, in some 
14 Latto, 37 D.C. Bar J. 57, 62-63 (Jan.-Mar. 1970). See also Smith, Canon 2: 
A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal 
Counsel Available, 48 Texas L. Rev. 285, 301-310 (1970); Note, '!'he Bar as Trade 
Association: Economics, Ethics and the First Amendment, 5 Harv. Civ. Rights-
Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 334 (1970). 
15 Brown, §29.2 supra. 
16 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
17Reardon, The Fair Trial-Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343, 347-351 
(1968). Segal, Fair Trial and Free Press- An Analysis of the Problem, 51 Mass. L.Q. 
106, 114-116 (1966); Tauro, Fair Trial-Free Press Revisited, 55 A.B.A.J. 417 (1969). 
18 DR 7-107(G) and (H). 
19 Concern over such points was expressed in the District of Columbia Bar's 
consideration of the Code. It rejected the publicity provisions. See Latto, 37 D.C. 
BarJ. 57, 62-63 (Jan.-Mar. 1970), and 2 id. 10 (April-July 1970). 
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cases, be as important (or even more vital to the client's interest) than 
the former. 20 
~29.8. The relation of the Code to an integrated bar: Problems of 
interpretation and enforcement. The Boston Bar Association's initial 
petition to adopt the Code provided little, if any, guidance in relating 
the Ethical Considerations to the Disciplinary Rules. Petitioner later 
clarified its prayer through a supplementary request that the Court 
state as part of a decree adopting the Code that the "Ethical Con-
siderations, as published by the American Bar Association, form a 
body of principles upon which the Canons are to be interpreted and 
further, that the Ethical Considerations are proper desiderata, con-
stantly to be borne in mind .... "1 No mention is mad€! of the foot-
notes which do present some contradictions.2 It is also apparent that 
the Ethical Considerations and Canons do not provide underlying 
principles consistent with their respective Disciplinary Rules. Po-
litical compromises were hammered out in forming the Disciplinary 
Rules, without proper attention to adjustment of the corresponding 
Ethical Considerations and Canons, to the point that the Code can 
be fairly accused of a lack of truth in packaging.s The Ethical Con-
siderations, per se, contain a more modem set of standards than 
those of the Disciplinary Rules and should also be adopted (with 
such revisions as may be necessary to accommodate them to the 
Massachusetts environment). The standards contained in the Ethical 
Considerations are enforceable through the effective though under-
rated sanctions of community and peer disapproval. 
There are two specific problem areas involving the role of bar 
associations in Code enforcement. The American Bar Association 
Ethics Committee has. issued and will issue opinions interpreting the 
Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations from time to time. The 
proper relation of these opinions to the Code as applicable in Massa-
20 Competence, neglect, fees and "misprision" are the remaining major issues 
treated in the Code of Professional Responsibility. These are discussed by Harold 
Brown, Esq., in §29.2 supra. 
§29.8. 1 Code Petition Proceeding, Supreme Judicial Court for the County of 
Suffolk, No. 69760 Equity, Memorandum of the Boston Bar Association. This is a 
misuse of the Ethical Considerations, which are a parallel set of standards "which 
embody the highest conduct aspired to by the profession [while the Disciplinary 
Rules represent the minimum] . . . • To have omitted either part would have 
been undesirable . . . ." Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its 
History and Objectives, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1970). See also the preamble and 
preliminary statement to the Code. It is submitted that the reluctance of the 
two bar associations to adopt the Ethical Considerations is the product of an 
unfortunate misunderstanding of the Code's structure and purpose. 
2 See Kaufman, The Lawyers' New Code, 22 Harv. L.S. Bull. 19, 37-!18 (1970). 
3 Compare, e.g., DR 2-10!1 with its corresponding Canon and Ethical Considera-
tions. See also Teschner, Lawyer Morality, !18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 789, 798-806 (1970). 
As to the compromises reached, see Sutton, The American Bar Association Code 
of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 Texas L Rev. 255, 262 (1970). 
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chusetts will require advance clarification. Also, the actions of local 
bar associations in preparing an "information" for submission to the 
courts will have to be understood for the private, unofficial actions 
that they are. They can not be allowed to become a sort of ad-
ministrative action to be affirmed unless lacking support on the 
"record" as a whole. The immediacy of this problem was indicated in 
the course of the clash between the MBA and the Boston Bar Asso-
ciation over Disciplinary Rule 6-101 regarding competence and ne-
glect. The rule, to be backed by sanctions ranging from censure to 
disbarment, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... [n]eglect a legal 
matter entrusted to him." The MBA opposed this with the argument 
that the rule is too harsh. The Boston Bar Association's rejoinder was 
that this argument is: 
... without merit. ... The standard of what constitutes "ne-
glect" is one which will be interpreted by the local bar associa-
tions themselves in light of all the attendant circumstances. Such 
flexibility will necessarily result in a standard which reflects the 
minimum requirements of general professional competence on the 
part of the practicing bar .... 4 [Emphasis added.] 
These problem areas raise the spectre of a de facto integrated bar-
indeed, a doubly integrated bar- with the judicial branch delegating 
rule-making powers to the national bar association and delegating 
application-of-rules-to-facts jurisdiction to local bar associations.5 
Further consideration is needed to define the rule-making proce-
dures of the Massachusetts judicial branch relating to professional 
ethics and the procedures for interpretation and enforcement of the 
Disciplinary Rules. This consideration should precede adoption of 
the Code in Massachusetts. 
4 Code Petition Proceeding, Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk, No. 
69760 Equity, Memorandum of the Boston Bar Association, at 22-23. 
5 Some delegation of such power is inherent in the Code. Disciplinary Rule 
2-102(A)(6) makes ABA certification conclusive proof of the legitimacy of law lists. 
Disciplinary Rule 3-lOl(B) forbids a lawyer to practice in a foreign jurisdiction 
"where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession in that 
jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) Cf. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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